Oxford economists show where the power lies in the British milk supply chain

25 February 2008

A model of the British milk supply chain, produced by Oxford University economists, confirms the common belief that supermarkets currently hold the bargaining power. In the chain – farmer-owned co-operatives, milk processors and the supermarkets – all compete for their share of the profit from the price of each litre of milk on the shelves. According to the research, co-funded by the Milk Development Council and government department Defra, the supermarkets’ strong bargaining position is largely due to three key aspects of the industry structure: the competition between milk processors; the purchase of milk under the supermarkets’ own labels; and the supermarkets’ ability to source from outside the domestic market if necessary.

The Oxford model explains how competitive forces influence buyer-seller relationships within the supply chain and what the implications are for supermarkets, farmers and processors in the price negotiations. Of the 15 pence potential profit margin on each litre of milk, only five pence per litre is available for negotiation between the processors. Supermarkets can dictate the upper price limit because they have the option of obtaining cheaper milk from abroad or overseas. The researchers found that supermarkets are able to secure 3.2 pence per litre or about 64 per cent of this five pence profit margin, and therefore nearly 90 per cent of the total supply chain profits.

The model shows that if there were fewer competing processors, an increased share of the profits would be returned to processors and the farmer-owned co-operatives, with less going to the supermarkets. It also shows that such a change would have very little impact on the price of milk for customers, but would reduce the amount of profit currently secured by supermarkets. 

Lead author Dr John Thanassoulis, from the Department of Economics at Oxford University, said: ‘The sale of milk under the supermarkets’ own labels increases the competition between the processors as supermarkets are then in the position where they can switch to other suppliers or alter supply contracts. This reduces the bargaining power that processors and farmers have in negotiating their slice of profit in the supply chain.’

According to the Oxford economists, the processors are the stronger partners in the negotiations that follow with the farmer-owned co-operatives. Of the 36 per cent of the available margin left after negotiations with the supermarkets, they keep 73 per cent of the remaining profit or around 1.3 pence per litre. The processors’ bargaining-power stems from their ability to walk away from negotiations with the co-operatives to secure milk supplies directly from the farmers (at a small premium over the co-operative price).

Unsurprisingly, the model shows that farmer-owned co-operatives are in the weakest position: they are only able to secure 0.5 pence per litre, or about three per cent of the total supply chain profits from liquid milk. The model has been used to test a number of scenarios that could potentially increase the profit returned to farmers: one way of increasing their bargaining power would be to find ways of strengthening farmer co-operatives to ensure a more equal balance of power in the price negotiations.

Huw Thomas, head of market information at the Milk Development Council, said: ‘The findings prove what farmers have been saying for many years – they just don’t have the bargaining power needed to ensure they can run profitable businesses. The MDC and the NFU have for some years highlighted these imbalances in the supply chain, such as the shortcomings in milk contracts offered by processors to farmers with a non-negotiable price.

‘This has led to low levels of investment on British dairy farms which have the potential to be one of the most highly efficient in the world. Although the industry is moving forward in some areas, such as the development of dedicated supply chains, this new economic model provides understanding that will help develop a more efficient market place that should result in a better deal for the British dairy farmer.’

For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact:

– Lead author Dr John Thanassoulis from Oxford University  on email: john.thanassoulis@economics.ox.ac.uk

– The Press Office of the University of Oxford on 01865 280534 ( weekends 07738 135619) or email: press.office@admin.ox.ac.uk

– Head of Market Information at the MDC, Huw Thomas, on 07766 106896 or email: huw.thomas@mdc.org.uk

Notes for Editors

* The model is based on three papers by lead authors, Dr John Thanassoulis and Dr Howard Smith, from the Department of Economics at the University of Oxford. The papers are: ‘Estimating Bargaining Power in the Supply Chain’, which explores the relationship between supermarkets, processors and suppliers in the Great British liquid milk industry; ‘Milk Prices in Retail Competition’, which examines retail pricing behaviour by supermarkets; and ‘Upstream Competition and Downstream Buyer Power’, which explores how industry structures such as the one for milk create buyer power for large buyers; and analyses the implications of mergers on the bargaining power wielded through the supply chain. These research outputs are in final preparation for the peer review process for publication in economics academic journals.

* The two lead authors of the research are Dr Howard Smith and Dr John Thanassoulis. Dr Howard Smith is University Lecturer in the Economics Department, University Of Oxford, and an Official Fellow of Keble College. His research is on empirical modelling of industry behaviour. He has studied a range of industries. In recent years a particular focus has been the supermarket industry. Dr John Thanassoulis is University Lecturer in the Economics Department and an Official Student (Fellow) of Christ Church. His main research interests concern bargaining in the supply chain; and strategies for bargaining and negotiation. Prior to returning to academia, John worked in the telecommunications industry and subsequently as a Competition Policy Consultant. Recently a particular focus of his academic research has been in the supermarket industry and in the broadcasting industry.